This paper presents new historical series of wages of white-collar workers in England during the Industrial Revolution that is based on individual-level data. Both nominal and real wages are shown for different categories of employees. Keywords: Industrial Revolution, banking industry, remuneration, England.
Introduction
Bankers in Great Britain have managed to bite an ever-bigger share of the income pie during the last decade as confirmed by Bell and Van Reenen (2010) . This tendency started towards the end of the preceding century -since 1985 finance employees have earned higher wages than workers in other sectors (Philippon & Reshef, 2012) while the share of overall income going to the top earners has been increasing since the 1970s (Atkinson, 2007; Van Reenen, 2011; . 1, 2 Long-term analysis of income inequality is complicated by the lack of consistent historical data. This is the problem this paper focuses on. The goal of this paper is to provide white-collar wages in the nineteenth century series with some comparative analysis and therefore pave the way for further in-depth exploration of income inequality and other topics.
Salaries of white-collar workers during the Industrial Revolution are an underexplored puzzle. Boot (1991) highlighted the fragmentary nature of evidence on the salaries of privately employed white-collar workers before the twentieth century, although he stated that some use has been made of public sector pay scales to indicate movements in privately employed white-collar workers with mixed success. Consistent white-collar and blue-collar wage series are needed for the study of income distribution during the period and this paper provides new and consistent white-collar wages series based on individual-level data during the Industrial Revolution.
The new historical series of wages are based on extensive dataset that was created from the archival information. It contains 21,025 man-years of data and provides information on 1 634 employees.
After the presentation of new wage series, preliminary comparison is made to other white-collar and also blue-collar workers' earnings and to the earnings in the banking industry outside of the period of interest. Thorough analysis of income inequality based on the newly created dataset is left for future research.
Motivation. Trends in the salaries of white-collar workers are an underexplored piece of the transformative era that made England the workshop of the world, moving it from an agrarian to an industrial economy and finally along the path to sustained Modern Economic Growth. The period from 1822 to 1845 is at the intersection of events of great significance in the history of Great Britain, this being the Industrial Revolution and Modern Economic Growth paralleled by the Victorian golden age. Wage statistics for blue-collar workers in Great Britain during this period are easier to obtain and interpret than for white-collar workers. This has led to the relative neglect of service sector pay, especially applicable to privately employed white-collar workers (Boot, 1991; Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1982) . This is an omission that leaves out lots of important information as the service sector encompassed 30.5% of the British labour force in 1871 (Mitchell & Deane, 1962) . Boot (1991) used data on wages at the Bank of Scotland to contribute to an understanding of movement in white-collar workers' pay between 1730 and 1880. The Bank of Scotland was a representative of free banking during the period under analysis. 3 This paper contributes by presenting wages at an English bank, the Bank of England, which faced much stricter banking regulations. 4 It solidified its monopoly on issuing notes during the period under question, starting with the 1833 Act which ruled that Bank of England's notes were legal tender for denominations above £5, and ending with the 1844 Charter Act which established elements of central banking by decreeing the Bank of England as the sole legal supplier of issuing notes. Moreover, Scotland had an extensive system of branches and agencies, whereas England did not (Clapham, 1958) . The Bank of England started opening branches in 1826.
The focus here is on individual-level, not occupation or aggregate, wages. As stated by Seltzer (2010) , there are very few studies which use individual-level wages prior to WWII. He used personnel records from the Union Bank of Australia and Williams Deacon's Bank in England to find out if firms cut nominal wages during deflation. He analyzed the late nineteenth and early twentieth century banking industry and the contribution of this paper is the use of individual-level data from the earlier period, the first half of the nineteenth century to answer different questions, namely the level of pay in the banking industry.
There is another reason why wages are an especially interesting phenomenon to study during the first half of the nineteenth century Great Britain. This period can be described as a good deflation by Bordo and Filardo's (2005) categorization. 6 Behavior of wages during a good deflation episode is not yet explored unlike their behavior during bad deflation. 7 Twentieth century history has highlighted an important link between price changes and wages during bad deflation episodes, for example wage rigidities during the interwar years are blamed for exacerbating the effects of deflation on unemployment. Therefore, it appears that salaries are expected to be quite responsive to macroeconomic developments such as changes in prices, both deflation and inflation. This paper does not focus on the relation between good deflation and wages, but its findings could serve as the first step for the future research on this topic.
Context. The banking industry in Great Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century contained an important turning point -the general structure of banking sector began assuming its modern form in the early 1820s. The age of joint-stock banking began during this period. The Bank itself went through a century-long debate regarding whether it was a State bank or a private institution and took its first steps towards its transformation into a national central bank (Giuseppi, 1966) .
The largest bank in Great Britain, The Bank of England, was founded in 1694 primarily to raise credit for the government. The functions of the Bank began to change after 1790 as direct government borrowing declined. During the period of study, it was a private financial institution that issued notes, maintained deposits, and also served as a fiscal agent of the Crown. Until 1826 it was the only joint-stock bank in England. The subsequent period between 1826 and 1844 witnessed the removal of restrictions on other banks. The Bank of England eventually transformed itself into a public institution whose rationale was to safeguard financial stability (Mokyr, 2009 ). 8 It might appear that the Bank of England was too unique to be representative of the banking industry, but, as Tennant (1865) has shown, the Bank of England was not different from any other bank despite certain special privileges which were conferred for public convenience. The main difference was that it needed to keep a larger amount of gold coin and notes than other banks because it had bigger business. What made it differ from other banks was its role as provider of credit for the government, especially in war times. The peaceful years after the 1815 invoked debates regarding the extent of the likewise obligation to be the source of money for the economy (Hixson, 1993) .
The Bank expanded considerably during the period under study. Many local banks collapsed in the 1825-1826 crisis, and the Bank seized the opportunity to promote its own notes in the country (Cairncross, 1995) . The Act of 1826 settled the question of branch banks for the Directors of the Bank who resolved to establish them in some of the principal towns (Giuseppi, 1966 , McCulloch & Ramsey, 1831 .
The second half of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain is described in the literature as rather miserable for clerks at the Bank of England (Giuseppi, 1966) . The working hours were not long -the Court of Directors minutes in 1821 stated that clerks were supposed to stay in the office from 9 am until 3:30 pm or 5 pm if they used an allowance of 1.5 hours for dinner (G4/44, p. 172). 5 Still, bank clerks were described as the hardest worked and the worst paid which contributed to the low quality of their work efforts and quarreling. Their numbers at the Bank were reduced after the 1820s and a haircut on their salaries followed. Salary scales were revised downwards, maximum salaries and annual increments cut, payments for some special duties trimmed down, and holidays reduced (Giuseppi, 1966) .
Data. The analysis utilizes annual salary and additional pay data for the Bank employees from 1822 to 1845 as reported in the Salary Ledger for this period (E41/10). This information was compiled by the Establishment Department. 9 The beginning of the book contained regulations and the information on salaries and additional pay for each employee followed. Additional pay included payments on certain appointments, compensation for duties such as Powers of Attorney and signing of Dividend Warrants (reductions on relinquishing them could lead to negative additional pay), and holiday money.
There were 434 pages in the book covering salary information for all the employees of the Bank between 1822 and 1845. Employees were arranged in an alphabetical order. There were only men employed as clerks at the Bank, because women were not yet allowed to work there. 10 The information available for almost all employees included their age when elected to their position, the name of the person who recommended them, and the office they were elected to. Their position within the office was usually denoted as well, although not always. There were some cases when one of either the position or the office was denoted, but not both.
Salary data for each employee was arranged by year alongside notes explaining appointments or any unusual circumstances. Increases according to a salary scale did not contain any explanations.
The pay information was subdivided into two categories -"salary" and "add to salary". Regulations contained rules for both. Once an employee left the bank, died or retired, all information about him was crossed out.
The Salary Ledger was well organized though some information was missing for some employees and was impossible to infer. For example, a list of the appointments was normally described on the top part of the section devoted to an employee, and normally an appointment that ended was crossed out. There were some cases where it was not crossed out, but it was possible to infer which year the appointments should be ascribed to from the year by year information that followed. There were some cases where either the appointments that ended were not crossed out or some of the appointments were not written in the year by year information which made it impossible to determine which year that appointment happened (there were not many cases like that).
Usually, even if some information was not clear in the top part of the page, there were clues that indicated which appointments came first (especially important for the very first appointment as it was normally not provided in the description for the first year, only in the top part of the section devoted to the employee), such as writing at visibly different times (slightly different ink or different handwriting) or for different information or simply the very first appointment could be inferred by accounting for all of the appointments in the year by year list, matching it to the appointments listed in the top section of the page, and inferring that the remaining appointment was the one that the employee was elected to (which was normally on the top of the list of appointments in that section, crossed out, and its handwriting and ink very clearly in line with the main information of that section, such as name, date of appointment, name of the person who recommended him etc.). As there were not too many cases where information could not be inferred at all or at a sensible level of confidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the quality of gathered data is good.
The dataset that was created from the archival information contains 21,025 manyears of data and provides information on 1 634 employees. It is available from the author at the request.
Results
Number of people employed. The overall number of employees and the numbers hired during analyzed years and moved from the main office in London to another branch are shown in Table 1 . The number of employees increased quite consistently until about 1837 and then stayed on a similar level with some fluctuations until the end of the period. Some information about the dynamics of people working in the bank can be seen from the Figure 1 which breaks up workers into groups by the number of years spent in the bank. It shows that employees tended to build their careers in the Bank once elected there -there were always much bigger numbers of those who worked for at least 10 years. Another interesting development is the sudden increase in those who worked for less than five years starting in 1824. The steep increase in the number of hired young workers must have been related to the expansion in the business, particularly the opening of the branch banks starting in 1826.
Pay of all staff. Broad developments in remuneration at the Bank can be seen in Figure 2 which shows trends in total pay (annual salary and additional pay). Mean total pay and salary for all staff exhibited higher remuneration versus those of the London staff in Figure 2 , because mean annual total pay and salary components of it were higher for those working at the branches in the years from 1822 to 1845.
As pay was strongly correlated with the number of years spent at the Bank the steep increase in the share of young workers accounts for some of the changes in the average pay during the period. Their pay was relatively small, and especially so until the steep increase in their pay scales in 1844, so the increase in the percentage of young workers at the bank led to a reduction in average pay. The share of young workers started making a pronounced impact on average wages in 1829. This is the year when total average pay started decreasing for the staff both in London and overall, as seen in Figure 2 .
11 This corresponds to the beginning of the steep increase in workers who had worked for less than 10 years at the Bank. Therefore, the impact of the steady increase in the share of young workers started making its impact only when the first cohort of the bloated intake of employees were passed on to the employees who had worked for more than 5, but less than 10 years at the bank. Until then, the share of young employees was not yet significant to make its impact on average wages felt. Another and probably less important factor for changes in average pay is the reduced number of promotions in the London office. Promotions started declining after 1830. The reason this decrease in promotions did not necessarily lead to a decrease in average pay is because promotions were not always associated with higher pay. Only 52.83% of promotions in the London office were associated with an increase in salary and 57.47% of them entailed an additional to salary pay. Also, 27.39% of promotions entailed reductions in salaries. Therefore, although the mean change in salary was £12.53 and mean additional pay was £32.27 during the year of promotion, the impact of changes in the number of promotions in the London office is expected to have had an effect less pronounced than the one entailed by changes in the age structure of employees. Trends in additional pay did not diverge much from the trends in total pay because additional pay was a relatively small component of total remuneration (unlike bonuses in today's financial world). 12 The average share of bonuses at the Bank in 1822-1845 was 1.76% (1.48% if excluding the year 1822 which is an outlier). This is much less than the share of bonuses for contemporary bankers. In 2008, bonuses comprised 8.6% of total pay for those outside of the top decile and 44% for the top percentile bankers (Bell & Van Reenen, 2014 ). Giuseppi (1966) described how additional pay was greatly reduced at the beginning of the 1920s at the Bank, and this is evident in Figure 3 with the steep drop in additional pay in 1822. But, as can be seen from Figure 2 , mean total remuneration exhibited no such decline up until 1828 when it started a long-lasting decrease in average pay which ended in 1836 and stabilized thereafter. An explanation for the lack of decline in total pay, despite a steep decrease in additional pay, in 1822 lies in an increase in annual salaries in 1822 and 1823 that made up for the decline in additional pay.
Ligita VISOCKYTĖ
Pay by categories. Average salaries per office and by occupation are shown in (Hennessy, 1995) . Salaries by office. Average salaries by year across different offices were generated from the data that could be attributed confidently to a particular office. There were relatively few entries where information was missing or difficult to infer.
The average pay over the whole period, from 1822 to 1845, ranged from £117.01 to £255.84 across offices, so there was a significant difference in pay when working in different offices. Cashiers, Discount, and Power of Attorney offices were all paid higher salaries relative to workers in other offices. Their average total pay was £255.84, £242.17, and £224.57, respectively, between 1822 and 1845. The average pay for the offices in the middle range varied from £211.25 for the Chancery/Exchequer offices to £218.73 for the Inspector/Investigator offices. The average pay for the offices in the lower range varied from £119.01 for the Accounting offices to £199.42 for the Per Cents offices.
Salaries by occupation. Similarly, to the analysis by office, the data used to generate information across occupations were only that which could be attributed confidently to a particular occupation (Table 3) .
Unskilled workers received the lowest salaries -an average of £86.19 throughout the period without any meaningful fluctuations. All skilled occupations, on the contrary, exhibited significant fluctuations. Total pay for them all decreased at the very beginning of the period of interest, but trends diverged after that. Senior managers received the highest wages and experienced slow, but persistent increases in total pay after 1827, while "other skilled" workers' pay decreased persistently after 1830. The pay of middle managers, clerks, and tellers fluctuated around their averages without any significant trends after the initial drop in pay. Looking at their averages throughout the period of interest, middle managers were best paid with an average total pay of £240.97, next came clerks with the average of £223.35, then tellers with the average of £217.41, and lastly other skilled workers with £198.28 average pay.
After the steep decrease at the beginning of the period, additional pay exhibited significant fluctuations for all occupations except for unskilled workers who received very insignificant amounts of additional pay.
Total remuneration for skilled workers increased while for unskilled workers it decreased during the period. These findings are in line with Williamson (1985) , who argued that inequality followed the Kuznets curve during the nineteenth century, increasing until 1870 and declining thereafter. Additional pay was insignificant for unskilled workers, but not always for skilled workers. Additional pay fluctuates more than salaries and these fluctuations distort real trends. This is particularly evident for skilled workers in 1822-1823.
Comparison with Wages of other Workers
Average wages of workers in England and Wales and average wages at the Bank are reported in Tables 4 and 5 .
Low-skilled workers at the Bank were paid high wages compared to other lowskilled workers in Great Britain. An average low-skilled employee at the Bank got paid £91.56 in 1827 and £85.18 in 1835 and the average wage of the low-skilled workers in England and Wales ranged between £31.05 and £84.39 in 1827 and between £30.03 and £87.20 in 1835. These numbers are much lower if excluding messengers and porters who were the highest paid of all the low-skilled workers, earning on average £84.39 in 1827 and £87.20 in 1835. The Bank of England messengers and porters earned £87.78 in 1827 and £82.56 in 1835 which does not differ much from the average pay in this occupation outside the Bank. Therefore, it appears Note: Data from the Bank of England salary dataset.
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that low-skilled workers at the Bank were mostly paid higher wages than expected except for some occupations, such as messengers and porters which were paid broadly in line with their pay elsewhere.
The average pay of all skilled employees at the Bank in the selected years, i. e. 1827 and 1835, was higher than most of the occupations reported in Table 5 , such as shipbuilding, engineering, building, printing trades, cotton spinners, schoolmasters, surgeons and doctors. Government highwage and clerks' pay rose faster elsewhere than at the Bank between 1827 and 1835, the average pay being lower than the one at the Bank in 1827, but higher in 1835. Only two blocks of the high-skill occupations, namely solicitors and barristers, engineers and surveyors, earned consistently higher average pays than workers at the Bank.
A comparison of average wages between clerks in England and Wales and clerks at the Bank, as reported in Tables 4  and 5 , might lead one to mistakenly infer that clerks at the Bank were paid lower than the industry average. Williamson (1985) reports that the average clerk was paid £240.29 in 1827 and £269.11 in 1835, and the average Bank of England clerk was paid £217.44 in 1827 and £210.22 in 1835. The comparison of these numbers might be misleading because his categorization of clerks is more encompassing than clerks as used in the Bank of England analysis. Clerks for Williamson's England and Wales' statistic includes not only Bank clerks, but also Law, Commercial, Railway clerks, Accountants, and Auctioneers (Williamson, 1982) . Therefore, it might be more reasonable to compare clerks as defined in Table 5 to all skilled employees at the Bank.
Additional insights can be gained by comparing the averages of pay at the Bank to the blue-collar and white-collar averages as reported by Williamson (1985, p. 9) . On average, blue-collar workers earned £51.35 and white-collar workers earned £142.62 in England and Wales in 1827. Thus, average total pay at the Bank was 334.53% of the blue-collar and 120.45% of the whitecollar worker's earnings.
Real wages. Table 6 reports real wages at the Bank. The construction of the table used information from Boot's (1999) reported indices for middle-class families (one based on the expenditure of a household on £250 income and another one on £750 income). His indices are particularly well-suited as he used a set of budgets of families who lived in London in the mid1820s to construct the indices of the cost of living for the middle-class families. A third allocation of expenditure based on the Feinstein's working-class cost of living and reported in Boot (1999) is used for unskilled workers. Allocation of expenditure by class was done in line with Boot (1999) : the one based on the expenditure of a household on £250 income was applied to incomes ranging from £150 to £500, the one on £750 income -for incomes above £500. Feinstein's index was used for incomes below £150. Total real pay for the year is a sum of these groups weighted by a fraction of workers in that group in a specific year.
Pay Inequality, Then and Now
The comparison of pay in the banking industry to both average pay in the UK and to the top 10% average income in both 2010 and 1827 reported in Table 7 reveals an increase in inequality in pay, specifically in the banking industry. Bell and Van Reenen (2014) compiled 2010 average pay information at 10 main London banks. 
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The average salary across these institutions, £283,000, is 372% of the UK top 10% average adult income, £76,090. (Williamson, 1985, p. 14) . The mean of the average total annual remuneration of all London staff in 1822-1845 was £170.33, which did not differ much from the average salary.
Another way to look at this inequality is to compare the highest and lowest paid workers within the Bank. The average total pay for the top 10% at the Bank's London office was £331.78 and £151.40 for the bottom 90% in 1822-1845 period. The top 1% pay fluctuated the most, while incomes of the other two groups -2-5% and 6-10% -were quite stable throughout the period as can be seen from Figure 4 . Also, the incomes of the top 1% were significantly higher than those of the 2-5% and 6-10% groups. The average incomes were £725.44, £347.66, and £279.27 respectively during the period.
Generalization to the Banking Industry
An important question to consider is how much the findings in the Bank can be generalized to the banking industry in Great Britain during the period. A comparison of findings at the Bank with data from the other banks reported in Table 8 reveals that the level of pay at the Bank was mostly commensurate with other banks in London, but less so with banks outside of London. The structure of pay was similar across Great Britain. Glyn Mills, Williams Deacon's, and Coutts were London private banks. These banks referred to their employees as clerks; therefore, comparisons need to be made with caution as salary data for them do not contain only workers who are categorized as clerks in this paper.
The range of pay of clerks in the narrow sense -as defined in this paper's analysis of the Bank of England -does not diverge much from the ones at the Glyn Mills and Williams Deacon's banks. It is also roughly in line with the two lower bands of pay at the Coutts banks. The highest paid clerks at Coutts (only one in 1830) received higher pay, in line with the senior managers at the Bank of England, such as the Chief Accountant and Chief Cashier who both received £1,000 in 1830. The third important position at the Bank, Secretary, got paid slightly lower, £700 in 1830. Therefore, it appears that even though the Bank of England was a much bigger bank than the other London banks with a more complicated staff structure, its pay was not out of sync with other London banks.
Bankers working outside London and outside England earned less than at the Bank of England. Clerks (in the narrow sense) were paid somewhat higher wages there than at the Bank of Scotland, though the pay for the highest-ranking employees 
Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the presentation of new historical series of wages of white-collar workers during the Industrial Revolution that is based on individual-level data. Nominal wages are reported by office and by occupation. Series of real wages are presented for all employees besides separate series for clerks, skilled, unskilled, top 1% and bottom 90% employees. Major trends in remuneration at the Bank concur with the arguments in the existent literature. The gap in pay for skilled and unskilled workers increased during the period which is in line with Williamson (1985) , who argued that inequality followed the Kuznets curve during the nineteenth century.
Changes in the distribution of ages affected strongly the average pay at the institution. Employees joined the Bank at an early age and stayed there for very long time. Their pay was strongly correlated with the length of service. A significant increase in the share of young workers at the Bank starting in 1824 led to lower average pay at the institution.
A comparison with other employees in the economy showed that the pay of the low-skilled workers at the Bank was at the higher end of the low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers at the Bank got paid better than most, but not all, occupations in England and Wales. Only two categories of highly-paid occupations, namely solicitors and barristers, engineers and surveyors, earned consistently higher average pay than skilled employees at the Bank.
Comparisons with pay afforded at other banks during the period revealed that pay at the Bank was mostly in line with or higher than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Evidence shows that its pay was representative of the structure of salary differentials in the banking industry, especially in London. The main difference was that the level of pay was higher at the Bank than outside London and outside England.
The compiled dataset of wages in England during the second part of the Industrial Revolution can be used to further analyze the banking industry during the period, such as its promotion policy. This could be done in line with Seltzer's (2007) analysis done for Williams Deacon's bank at the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Additionally, the dataset could be used to investigate the return to human capital by analyzing universities attended by employees and then examining the social background of their families traced by their names. Also, the findings in this paper can serve as the first step in the analysis of how wages responded to the secular good deflation during the period and if wages behave differently during good as compared to bad and ugly deflations as defined by Bordo and Filardo (2005) .
Also, I would like to express my gratitude to my mother, Ona Visockienė, for her support in transferring the data from the archival material to the spreadsheet due to my inability to accomplish everything because of the shock experienced during the bomb explosions in the London Marathon 2013 and everything that followed. Scottish Free Banking lasted from 1716 until 1844 (White, 1990) or 1845 (Cowen & Kroszner, 1989 ). 4 The Bank of England served as a shadow central bank for Scotland (White, 1993) . 5 There was an improvement in the work hours after 1848 when it was decided that public business should stop at 4 p.m. (Giuseppi, 1966) . 6 Bordo and Filardo (2005) characterize deflations into good (caused by positive supply shocks and accompanied by economic growth), bad (caused by demand shocks and associated with a recession), and ugly (the ones where deflation becomes self-reinforcing). As noted above, the Bank Charter Act of 1844 was instrumental here as it established some elements of central banking (Mokyr, 2009 ). 9 As described in the Bank of England archives catalogue records. 10 Mean nominal salaries started their downward trend in 1828, but the decline was very small, and the more pronounced decrease started in 1829. 11 The share of bonuses in contemporary bankers' pay is best seen in Figure 4 in Bell and Van Reenen (2014, p. 9). 12 Here, clerks include Bank clerk, Law clerk, Auctioneer/appraiser, etc., Accountant, Commercial clerks, Railway clerks, Station agents (Williamson, 1982) . 13 Though there were two women, Sarah Bruce and Susanna Tyrrell, who worked in the Bank as housekeepers between 1822 and 1845. 14 The information is on private London banks which, considering that the Bank of England was also a private institution in 1822-1845, is particularly well suited for comparison purposes here. 15 These banks are Bank of America, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J P Morgan, Lloyds Bank, Morgan Stanley, RBS (Bell & Reenen, 2014 ). 16 Average cash compensation which excludes equity-based and deferred bonuses, is £568 000 (Bell & Reenen, 2014) . 17 Boot (1991) reported 13 clerks working in 1807 and 20 in 1850, and from other reported information it appears reasonable to infer that the number of clerks in 1830 was between these two numbers. 18 As inferred from the Figure 5 in Boot (1991, p. 641). 19 As inferred from the Figure 5 in Boot (1991, p. 641). 20 Data are for the period outside of interest, 1850 to 1880 as reported in Boot (1991) . 21 Includes senior and middle managers, clerks and tellers, and excludes "other skilled employees".
